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The Emergence of 
“Regular and Predictable” 
as a Treasury Debt 
Management Strategy
1. Introduction 
reasury debt management is the set of actions taken by 
U.S. Treasury officials in the course of financing the 
federal deficit and refinancing maturing debt. An important 
dimension of debt management is the decision of which 
maturity debt to sell. On the one hand, short-term financing 
can complicate budget planning because it raises the variability 
of near-term interest expenses; on the other, longer term 
borrowings have a higher expected cost because of term premia 
on intermediate- and long-term interest rates.
During the 1970s, Treasury officials revised the framework 
within which they selected the maturities of new notes and 
bonds. Previously, they chose maturities on an offering-by-
offering basis, typically after surveying market participants to 
identify investor demand for different maturities. By 1982, the 
Treasury had abandoned this type of “tactical” debt manage-
ment and was selling notes and bonds on a “regular and 
predictable” schedule, with monthly offerings of two-year 
notes and quarterly sales of longer term securities. 
The switch from tactical to regular and predictable debt 
management is illustrated in Charts 1 and 2. Between 1960 and 
1964, the Treasury made regular quarterly offerings, for cash or 
in exchange for maturing debt, of coupon-bearing securities in 
February, May, August, and November of each year (Chart 1). 
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• In 1975, the U.S. Treasury had to finance a 
rapidly growing federal deficit with sales of 
new notes and bonds on an offering-by-
offering basis. 
￿ Because the timing and maturities of these 
“tactical” offerings did not follow a predictable 
pattern, the issuances sometimes caught 
investors off guard and disrupted the market. 
￿ Treasury officials, recognizing the need for 
more regularized offerings, revised the 
framework within which they selected the 
maturities of new notes and bonds. 
￿ By 1982, the Treasury had abandoned tactical 
issuance and was following a “regular and 
predictable” schedule of new note and bond 
offerings. 
￿ The move to regular and predictable issuance 
was widely credited with reducing market 
uncertainty, facilitating investor planning, and 
lowering the Treasury’s borrowing costs.
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Chart 1
Maturities of Offerings of Coupon-Bearing Securities, 
January 1960-December 1964
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Chart 2
Maturities of Offerings of Coupon-Bearing Securities, 
January 1982-December 1986
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The number and maturities of these tactical “midquarter 
refundings,” though, varied from quarter to quarter. The only 
persistent feature was the appearance of an “anchor” issue 
maturing in one to one and a half years. As Chart 1 shows, the 
Treasury also sold coupon-bearing securities outside of 
midquarter refundings on nine occasions between 1960 and 
1964. However, neither the timing of the nine issues nor their 
maturities followed any readily apparent pattern.
By comparison, the regularity of the Treasury’s offerings 
between 1982 and 1986 is striking (Chart 2). The Treasury 
continued to sell coupon-bearing securities in the middle of 
each quarter, but offered the same maturities in every 
refunding: a three-year note, a ten-year note, and, with two 
exceptions, a thirty-year bond.1 Additionally, it sold two-year 
notes monthly; four-, five-, and seven-year notes quarterly; 
and, with two exceptions, twenty-year bonds quarterly until 
terminating the twenty-year series in the spring of 1986. The 
Treasury sold two-, three-, and ten-year notes and thirty-year 
bonds in amounts that did not vary substantially from offering 
to offering (Charts 3 and 4). Other series exhibited a similar 
pattern of substantially comparable amounts sold from 
offering to offering.
This article examines why, during the 1970s, Treasury 
officials changed the framework within which they made their 
1Following the February 1982 midquarter refunding, the Treasury exhausted 
its authority to issue bonds with coupon rates in excess of a statutory ceiling of 
4¼ percent. It was limited to issuing bills and notes until Congress increased 
the exemption following the August 1982 refunding.
debt management decisions. We show that the Treasury 
financed an unusually rapid expansion of the deficit in 1975 
with a flurry of tactical offerings. The offerings disrupted the 
market and provided the impetus to adopt a program of 
regular and predictable issuance that allowed investors to plan 
future commitments of funds with greater confidence.
The emergence of regular and predictable as a Treasury debt 
management strategy is important for three reasons. First, this 
type of issuance is one of the pillars of the modern Treasury 
securities market. In 1982, Mark Stalnecker, Treasury Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Federal Finance, expressed the view that 
“regularity of debt management removes a major source of 
market uncertainty, and assures that Treasury debt can be sold 
at the lowest possible interest rate consistent with market 
conditions at the time of sale.”2 More recently, Gary Gensler, 
Treasury Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets, observed 
that “consistency and predictability in [the Treasury’s] 
financing program … reduces uncertainty in the market and 
helps minimize our overall cost of borrowing.”3 Second, the 
circumstances that led to regular and predictable issuance 
illustrate the costs of tactical issuance, and the benefits of 
2Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs (1982, p. 5).
3Testimony before the House Committee on Ways and Means, June 24, 1998 
(available at <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/rr2555.htm>). Gensler went 
on to note that “in keeping with this principle, Treasury does not seek to time 
markets; that is, we do not act opportunistically to issue debt when market 
conditions appear favorable.”FRBNY Economic Policy Review / March 2007 55
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Chart 4
Sales of Three-Year Notes, Ten-Year Notes, 
and Thirty-Year Bonds in Midquarter Refundings, 
January 1982-December 1986
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of the Public Debt. 
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predictability, in an environment of large deficits. Finally, the 
emergence of regular and predictable issuance shows how a 
change in the economic environment can induce policymakers 
to alter the practices of the institutions they manage.
The first half of the 1970s also witnessed the successful 
introduction of auction sales of notes and bonds. There is an 
important connection between this development and the 
emergence of regular and predictable issuance: Treasury bills 
provided a template for both actions. This raises the question 
of why, since the Treasury had been auctioning bills on a 
regular and predictable basis for decades, it did not introduce 
regular auction sales of notes and bonds at an earlier date.4 
In fact, the Treasury did try to institutionalize auction sales of 
Treasury bonds in 1935 and again in 1963, but failed in both 
attempts.5 The earlier attempts suggest that officials appreci-
ated the advantages of auction sales of notes and bonds long 
before they were able to institutionalize such sales. Conversely, 
the absence of any attempt to introduce regular and predictable 
4The Treasury first issued bills in 1929; it began auctioning bills on a regular 
and predictable basis in the early 1930s. Some of the same observers who 
advocated auction sales of notes and bonds in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
also advocated regular and predictable sales of those securities. See Joint 
Economic Committee (1959, p. 3024, testimony of Milton Friedman), 
Friedman (1960, pp. 60-5), and Gaines (1962, ch. 8).
sales of notes and bonds before 1972 suggests that, prior to 
that time, tactical flexibility may have been perceived as 
more beneficial.
Our study proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents an 
overview of the goals and instruments of Treasury debt 
management and the choice between tactical and regular and 
predictable issuance. In Section 3, we explain how the Treasury 
conducted financing operations in the 1960s. The Treasury’s 
initial steps toward “regularizing” short-term notes in 1972 are 
examined in Section 4. We explain in Section 5 how rapid 
growth of the deficit in 1975 led the Treasury to begin 
embracing regular and predictable issuance more completely. 
Section 6 presents empirical evidence consistent with the 
hypothesis that regular and predictable issuance mitigated a 
cost of tactical issuance. Finally, we briefly describe in Section 7 
the subsequent development of debt management policy 
within the framework of regular and predictable issuance.
2. Goals and Instruments 
of Debt Management
Debt management has goals, or objectives, and it has decision 
variables that managers have to choose to advance toward their 
stated goals.
5Garbade (2004) suggests that the Treasury failed in its earlier attempts 
primarily because it began by auctioning long-term bonds. The Treasury was 
more successful when, in the early 1970s, it began by auctioning short-term 
notes and then gradually extended the maturities of its offerings. The gradual 
extension gave dealers an opportunity to build up their risk management and 
sales programs in an orderly fashion.
The Treasury did try to institutionalize 
auction sales of Treasury bonds in 1935 
and again in 1963, but failed in both 
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Financing at least cost over time is the most frequently 
and consistently cited goal of Treasury debt management. 
Andrew Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury from March 1921 
to February 1932, was said to manage the public debt “by 
providing various types of securities suited to the needs of 
various classes of lenders, thereby obtaining funds for needed 
periods at minimum cost.”6 Robert Roosa, Treasury Under 
Secretary for Monetary Affairs from January 1961 to December 
1964, observed that Treasury debt “must be placed at an 
interest cost that will stand up to the critical test of both the 
Congress and the public who do not want to have any more 
money devoted to the debt service . . . than is necessary.”7
The Treasury has sometimes announced debt management 
goals in addition to least-cost financing. During the 1960s, 
Treasury officials sometimes made debt management decisions 
to maintain upward pressure on short-term interest rates (to 
support the value of the dollar in foreign exchange markets) 
and/or to limit upward pressure on long-term interest rates 
(to promote economic growth).8 In the 1990s, officials focused 
on three debt management goals, including ensuring the avail-
ability of adequate cash balances and promoting efficient 
capital markets as well as financing at least cost.9 
More recently, however, Peter Fisher, Under Secretary of 
the Treasury from August 2001 to October 2003, observed that 
ensuring the availability of adequate cash balances is a 
constraint on, rather than a goal of, debt management and that 
the single objective of financing at least cost best describes the 
basis for Treasury debt management decisions.10 
6Simmons (1947, p. 334).
7Roosa (1963).
8The resulting decisions to sell short-term debt in lieu of long-term debt were 
typically made in the context of some version of the “segmented markets” 
theory of the term structure of interest rates, which implies that debt securities 
of different maturities are imperfect substitutes and that exogenous variation 
in the maturity composition of the debt can affect the shape of the yield curve. 
See Culbertson (1957). See also the “preferred habitat” theory proposed by 
Modigliani and Sutch (1966, 1967) and the analysis in Modigliani and Sutch 
(1966) of the attempt by Treasury and Federal Reserve officials to alter the 
shape of the yield curve by raising short-term rates and reducing, or at least 
maintaining, long-term rates in what became known as “Operation Twist.” 
9Testimony of Gary Gensler, Treasury Assistant Secretary for Financial 
Markets, before the House Committee on Ways and Means, June 24, 1998 
(available at <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/rr2555.htm>), and 
testimony of Lewis Sachs, Treasury Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets, 
before the House Committee on Ways and Means, September 28, 1999 
(available at <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/ls128.htm>). 
The primary decision variables of Treasury debt 
management are the quantities of debt to be sold at different 
maturities. Other important decision variables include the type 
of offering, that is, a fixed-price subscription offering or an 
auction offering in either a single-price or multiple-price 
format, and whether the Treasury is obligated to repay fixed 
nominal amounts or amounts indexed to current prices (as has 
been the case with inflation-protected securities issued since 
1997).
This article examines the emergence of a self-imposed 
constraint on the Treasury’s method of choosing the timing 
and maturities of new issues. As illustrated in Section 7, the 
constraint limits the frequency with which the timing and 
maturities of new offerings are changed. Treasury officials 
adopted the constraint to advance the always important (and, 
more recently, unique) goal of financing at least cost. As we 
show in the next section, prior to 1970, tactical issuance 
preserved a high level of managerial discretion that allowed 
debt managers to shift the focus of their decision-making 
literally from offering to offering. It also allowed debt managers 
substantial flexibility as to when they would raise new money 
with sales of coupon-bearing debt. However, tactical issuance 
had a downside: investors could not readily anticipate what 
maturity debt the Treasury would choose to sell and they could 
not easily anticipate when the Treasury would sell notes and 
bonds outside of the midquarter refundings. The downside 
became excessively costly when Treasury officials had to 
finance unprecedented peacetime deficits after 1974. In order 
to facilitate investor planning and thereby reduce Treasury 
borrowing costs, the officials began to adopt a more regular 
and predictable issuance schedule.
3.  Debt Management in the 1960s
In mid-1960, the marketable public debt of the United States 
was $184 billion, including $33 billion in bills, $18 billion in 
certificates of indebtedness, and $133 billion in notes and 
10Remarks of Under Secretary of the Treasury Peter Fisher to the Futures 
Industry Association, March 14, 2002 (available at <http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/po1098.htm>). See also remarks of Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury Brian Roseboro to the UBS Eighth Annual Reserve Management 
Seminar for Sovereign Institutions, June 3, 2002 (available at <http://
www.treas.gov/press/releases/po1349.htm>).
Financing at least cost over time is the 
most frequently and consistently cited 
goal of Treasury debt management.  
The primary decision variables of Treasury 
debt management are the quantities of 
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bonds. Bills were single-payment instruments maturing in a 
year or less; the other three instruments made semi-annual 
coupon payments. A certificate of indebtedness matured in no 
more than a year from its date of issue; notes matured in no 
more than five years. A bond could have any term but could 
not be issued with a coupon rate in excess of 4¼ percent.11
There were four distinct types of Treasury financings at the 
beginning of the 1960s: bill financings, midquarter refundings, 
stand-alone offerings, and advance refundings. All but the last 
were mechanisms for borrowing money to finance the federal 
deficit and to refinance maturing debt.12 
3.1 Bill Financings
The Treasury used bills to bridge the gap between cash 
management and debt management and to finance a portion of 
the debt at low short-term interest rates. Thirteen-week bills 
had been auctioned on a regular weekly basis since 1937. In late 
1958, the Treasury began a parallel program of regular weekly 
auctions of twenty-six-week bills “to place on a routine basis, 
so far as practicable, the roll-over of … debt maturing within 
one year.”13 The sizes of the thirteen- and twenty-six-week-bill 
auctions varied from time to time, but investors knew the 
auctions would be held and they knew the amounts offered 
would be comparable to what was maturing—perhaps a bit less 
if the government was flush with cash or a bit more if cash 
balances were low. In early 1959, the Treasury further 
expanded its bill offerings by introducing regular quarterly 
sales of one-year bills, to be issued on or about the fifteenth of 
the first month of a quarter and to mature a year later.14
11The 4¼ percent ceiling on Treasury bond rates was established by the Third 
Liberty Bond Act (April 4, 1918). A brief history of the rate ceiling appears in 
Committee on Ways and Means (1967, pp. 25-8).
12An advance refunding was an offer to exchange a new security for an equal 
principal amount of an existing, shorter term security that was not close to 
maturity. For example, an advance refunding in October 1960 gave investors 
an opportunity to exchange a bond maturing in nine years for an equal 
principal amount of a bond maturing in thirty-eight years. Treasury officials 
introduced advance refundings in 1960 when they became concerned that a 
growing concentration of Treasury indebtedness in short-term securities 
might be contributing to inflation (U.S. Treasury Department 1960, p. 4; Beard 
1966, p. 7). See also Committee on Finance (1962) and Bryan (1972). Advance 
refundings did not play any substantial role in the emergence of regular and 
predictable issuance.
13Federal Reserve Bank of New York Circular no. 4663, November 18, 1958.
14The Treasury also used irregular offerings of “tax anticipation bills” to 
smooth seasonal variations in tax receipts. Tax anticipation bills were first 
introduced in 1951 (Nelson 1977).
3.2 Midquarter Refundings
By 1960, maturing coupon-bearing debt was refinanced 
exclusively in midquarter refundings. Offerings were some-
times in exchange for maturing debt and sometimes for cash. 
New issues were always set to mature on the fifteenth of the 
second month of a quarter so they could be refinanced in 
subsequent refundings.
An exchange offer was an offer to exchange a new issue for an 
equal principal amount of a maturing issue and was available 
only to holders of the maturing debt. An investor who was not 
interested in exchanging a maturing issue could either sell the 
debt to another investor who wanted to acquire the new issue 
or present the debt for redemption. The fraction of a maturing 
issue presented for redemption was known as “attrition.”
A cash offering was made at a fixed price and was open to all 
investors. Subscriptions were filled on a pro-rata basis. Cash 
refundings allowed the Treasury to raise modest amounts of 
new cash by offering somewhat more than what was needed to 
redeem maturing debt.
Midquarter refundings followed a regular routine. Toward 
the middle of the first month of each quarter, Treasury officials 
solicited the advice of market participants on what maturities 
were currently in demand and then held a press conference to 
announce what would be offered.15 Subscription books opened 
within a week of the announcement and remained open for 
several days, after which the Treasury announced the results 
and began to fill subscriptions. The entire process was 
completed by the middle of the second month of the quarter. 
Box 1 describes the origin of midquarter refundings.
15Although the Treasury kept in regular contact with a variety of market 
participants (Committee on Government Operations 1956, p. 113), it 
particularly solicited the views of several advisory committees when it 
contemplated a major operation. Committee members reflected their 
“impressions of what the market demand and supply is” (p. 50) and what 
they thought “could best be sold” (p. 63).
Midquarter refundings followed a regular 
routine. Toward the middle of the first 
month of each quarter, Treasury officials 
solicited the advice of market participants 
on what maturities were currently in 
demand and then held a press conference 
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Chart 5
Marketable Treasury Debt, 1950-2003
Source: Treasury Bulletin (various issues).
Note: The chart depicts outstanding marketable debt at the end of 
each fiscal year—on June 30 until and including June 30, 1976, and 
on September 30 thereafter.
 










3.3 Stand-Alone Cash Subscription Offerings
A stand-alone offering was an offering of a coupon-bearing 
security on a cash subscription basis outside of a midquarter 
refunding. The Treasury made stand-alone offerings when it 
needed funds to finance a deficit or to rebuild its cash balance 
following heavy attrition on a midquarter exchange offering. 
New issues sold in stand-alone offerings, like new issues sold in 
midquarter refundings, were set to mature on the fifteenth of 
the second month of a quarter to facilitate refinancing.
3.4 Debt Management Decisions
The variation in marketable Treasury debt in the 1960s is illus-
trated in Chart 5. Indebtedness did not decline, so midquarter 
refundings remained important. However, indebtedness did 
not grow rapidly, so stand-alone cash subscription offerings 
remained relatively unimportant. Marketable debt increased 
from $184 billion in 1960 to $226 billion in 1969, or less than 
$5 billion per year. The Treasury financed $17 billion of the 
$42 billion increase with bills and with certificates of 
indebtedness and $25 billion with notes and bonds.
As we observed, there was considerable irregularity in terms 
of the maturities offered in midquarter refundings in the first 
half of the 1960s. Table 1 summarizes the justifications 
provided by Treasury officials for their maturity choices. 
Two features are significant:
￿  As we discussed in Section 2, officials sometimes chose 
to issue short-term securities to maintain upward 
pressure on short-term interest rates (to support the 
value of the dollar) and to moderate upward pressure on 
long-term rates (to promote economic growth). At other 
times, officials emphasized the importance of main-
taining or extending the average maturity of the debt. 
Box 2 discusses the importance that Treasury officials 
attached to maturity extension.
￿  Maturity decisions were sometimes based on the 
character of contemporaneous demand. For example, 
investor preferences were important in the decision to 
offer 28¼-year bonds in July 1964, when Under Secretary 
Roosa stated that the bond market was “strong,” “eager,” 
and “indicating an actual need” for long-term bonds.16
Box 1
The Origin of Midquarter Refundings
The Treasury introduced midquarter refundings during the 1950s 
to ease constraints on the conduct of monetary policy. Both cash 
subscription offerings and exchange offerings were made on fixed 
terms: an investor could only accept or reject the terms proposed 
by the Treasury. A decision by Federal Reserve officials to tighten 
monetary policy during the five to seven days between the 
announcement of a new offering and the close of the subscription 
books therefore was liable to jeopardize the success of the offering. 
Following the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of March 1951 
and the restoration of Federal Reserve control of monetary policy, 
Federal Reserve officials adopted a policy of maintaining a fixed 
monetary policy during Treasury offerings.a Concentrating the 
Treasury’s longer term financings in four quarterly windows 
minimized the amount of time that the Treasury was in the market 
and thus maximized the amount of time during which monetary 
policy could be changed. Quarterly refundings also reduced direct 
competition with other issuers by providing constructive notice 
about when the Treasury would be in the market. By late 1958, 
80 percent of coupon-bearing Treasury debt was scheduled to 
mature on the fifteenth of February, May, August, or November 
of some future year.b
aThis policy was sometimes known as “even keeling.” See Gaines (1962, 
pp. 241-3, 264), Struble and Axilrod (1973), and Committee on Banking, 
Finance, and Urban Affairs (1982, pp. 32-3, testimony of Stephen Axilrod, 
Staff Director for Monetary and Financial Policy, Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System).
bFederal Reserve Bank of New York Circular no. 4663, November 18, 1958. 
(“For some time, the Treasury has been working towards scheduling its 
maturities on these quarterly dates to reduce the number of times each year 
its financing will interfere with other borrowers such as corporations, 
states, municipalities, etc.; to minimize the ‘churning’ in the money 
markets on the major quarterly corporate income tax dates; and to facilitate 
the effective execution by the Federal Reserve of its monetary policy.”)FRBNY Economic Policy Review / March 2007 59
Taken as a whole, midquarter refundings between 1960 and 
1964 evidenced a debt management process in which officials 
made maturity decisions on an offering-by-offering basis.
16“Treasury Offers Giant Refunding,” New York Times, July 9, 1964, p. 43, and 
“Treasury Offers Advance Refund of $41.7 Billion,” Wall Street Journal, July 9, 
1964, p. 3.
Midquarter refundings in the second half of the 1960s 
exhibited greater regularity than those in the preceding five 
years (Chart 6). However, the greater regularity was largely a 
by-product of the statutory prohibition on issuing bonds with 
coupon rates in excess of 4¼ percent. The rate ceiling kept the 
Treasury out of the bond market after May 1965. In the 
Table 1
Midquarter Refundings, 1960-64










(Billions of Dollars)a Comment
Feb. 1960 1 4¾ — 11.36e
May 1960 1 5 — 6.41e
Aug. 1960 1 7¾ — 8.75c
Nov. 1960 1¼ 5½ — 10.84e The Treasury reduced the term of the intermediate-term issue from 
seven years to five and a half years to make the offering 
“a little more attractive.”
Feb. 1961 1½ — — 6.90c The refunding offered only a single short-term note to maintain 
upward pressure on short-term interest rates and to limit upward 
pressure on long-term rates.
May 1961 1 2 — 7.75c The refunding offered two short-term issues to maintain upward 
pressure on short-term rates.
Jul. 1961b 1¼ 3, 6¾ — 12.20e Surveys indicated investor interest in securities out to seven years, 
but no interest in any longer maturities.
Nov. 1961 1¼ 4½, 13 — 6.96e
Feb. 1962 1 4½ — 11.18e A four-and-a-half-year issue was offered because surveys indicated 
bank interest in higher yielding (even if longer term) securities.
May 1962 1 3¾, 9½ — 11.68e A nine-and-a-half-year issue was offered because of continuing 
bank demand for higher yielding securities.
Aug. 1962 1 6½ 30 8.75c The thirty-year bond was a surprise. The Treasury cited the need for 
“balanced financing” (referring to a need to avoid contraction of 
average maturity).
Nov. 1962 1 3, 9¼ — 10.98e A “plain vanilla” financing in the midst of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Feb. 1963 1 5½ — 9.47e
May 1963 1 2¾ — 9.49e The refunding offered two short-term issues to maintain upward 
pressure on short-term rates.
Aug. 1963 1¼ — — 6.64e The refunding offered a single short-term note to maintain, and 
possibly even lift, short-term interest rates.
Nov. 1963 1½ — — 7.60c The refunding offered a single short-term note to maintain upward 
pressure on short-term rates.
Feb. 1964 1½ 2½ — 8.38e The maturities were selected to fill relatively open dates.
May 1964 1½ 10 — 10.61e Market participants expected a five-year note. The Treasury offered 
a ten-year bond to avoid “over-loading” the front end.
Jul. and Aug. 1964c 1½ 5¼, 9¼ 28¼ 10.13e, c Treasury surveys indicated a “strong” market, investors “eager” 
to acquire long-term bonds.
Nov. 1964 1½ — — 9.25c The refunding offered a single short-term note to maintain upward 
pressure on short-term rates.
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York circulars (1960-64); New York Times (1960-64); Wall Street Journal (1960-64).
aAmounts are total amount offered in a cash subscription offering (denoted “c”) or total amount of maturing securities eligible for exchange 
in an exchange offering (denoted “e”). 
b This refunding was accelerated because the security being refunded was a note that matured on August 1, 1961.
c The exchange portion of this refunding was accelerated to July to take advantage of favorable market conditions. See “Treasury Offers Giant Refunding,” 
New York Times, July 9, 1964, p. 43, and “Treasury Offers Advance Refund of $41.7 Billion,” Wall Street Journal, July 9, 1964, p. 3. Attrition was financed 
with a cash subscription offering in August 1964.60 The Emergence of “Regular and Predictable”
Chart 6
Maturities of Offerings of Coupon-Bearing Securities, 
January 1965-December 1969
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refundings between August 1965 and August 1967, officials 
typically offered only two securities: a short-term anchor issue 
and a note with a maturity at or near the five-year maximum. 
Following Congressional action in June 1967 to extend the 
maximum maturity of a note to seven years, officials began 
offering an anchor issue and a note maturing in six or seven 
years.
The Treasury also sold coupon-bearing securities in stand-
alone cash subscription offerings on nine occasions during the 
1960s.17 Table 2 summarizes the justifications for the matur-
ities of the nine issues. As in the midquarter refundings, 
Treasury officials were sometimes concerned with maintaining 
or extending the average maturity of the debt and were 
sometimes explicitly responsive to the character of 
contemporaneous demand.
17Additionally, in two auctions in 1963, the Treasury offered a total of $550 mil-
lion of long-term bonds to competing syndicates of securities dealers.
Box 2
Treasury Concerns with Debt Maturity
The average maturity of marketable Treasury debt fell from 
6.6 years in 1950 to 4.6 years in 1959 (see chart below). The decline 
was an inevitable result of the reluctance of Treasury officials to 
issue longer term debt. They did not want to issue longer debt 
when economic activity was strong and interest rates were high 
because such issuance would commit the Treasury to paying high 
rates for a long time, and they did not want to issue longer debt 
when activity was weak for fear of stifling a recovery.a
At the end of the 1950s, Treasury officials became concerned 
that the growing concentration of indebtedness in securities 
maturing in fewer than five years—and viewed as close substitutes 
for money—was contributing to price inflation. They introduced 
advance refundings in 1960 in an attempt to reverse the steady 
decline in average maturity.b As noted in Table 1, extending the 
average maturity of Treasury debt was also important from time to 
time in the Treasury’s maturity choices in midquarter refundings. 
The chart shows that the average maturity of marketable Treasury 
debt increased to 5.3 years by mid-1965.
Between mid-1965 and early 1973, the statutory 4¼ percent 
ceiling on Treasury bond coupon rates kept the Treasury from 
issuing bonds and led to a renewed decline in average maturity. 
Congress extended the maximum maturity of a note to seven years 
in 1967 and provided some exemptive relief from the 4¼ percent 
ceiling in 1971, but the renewed decline in average maturity was 
not reversed until Congress further extended the maximum 
maturity of a note to ten years in 1976.
aBeard (1966, p. 10) observed that “the cost of lengthening the debt [during 
periods of strong economic activity] appeared to be excessive since the 
Treasury would be saddled for extended periods with securities sold at 
cyclically high rates of interest” and that “many economists held that 
extensive sales of longer maturities during recessionary periods were 
contrary to desirable stabilization policies.” Volcker (1972) noted that “no 
time seems to be a good time for offering long-term Treasury securities—
either rates are too high or there is a desire to maximize the flow of funds 
to other borrowers.” See also U.S. Treasury Department (1960, p. 3).
bAdvance refundings are described in footnote 12.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / March 2007 61
4.  Debt Management between 1970 
and 1974
The first half of the 1970s was a time of transition for Treasury 
debt management. The changes that occurred reflected 
concern with the continuing decline in the average maturity 
of Treasury debt and the need to provide some measure of 
predictability in note offerings outside of midquarter 
refundings.
4.1 The Renewal of Bond Issuance and 
a Growing Regularity in Midquarter
Refundings
In 1971, Treasury officials became concerned with the 
continuing decline in the average maturity of Treasury debt 
(Box 2 chart) and petitioned Congress to eliminate the 4¼ per-
cent ceiling on bond rates. Congress declined to remove the 
ceiling but did authorize the Treasury to issue up to $10 billion 
of bonds at interest rates in excess of 4¼ percent.18 
18Committee on Ways and Means (1971, pp. 3, 5-7) and U.S. Treasury 
Department (1971, p. 10). Congress increased the amount of bonds that could 
be issued at interest rates in excess of 4¼ percent from time to time after 1971 
and eliminated the rate ceiling altogether in November 1988.
In the August 1971 midquarter refunding, Treasury officials 
used their new bond issuance authority to give holders of 
maturing securities an opportunity to exchange the securities 
for ten-year bonds. The Treasury offered a bond in virtually 
every subsequent refunding (Chart 7).19 It first offered a long-
term bond in a refunding in May 1973, and it continued to 
offer a long-term bond in every subsequent refunding. By mid-
1974, the Treasury was offering a short-term anchor note, an 
intermediate-term note of six or seven years, and a long-term 
bond on a fairly regular basis in its midquarter refundings.
4.2 The Introduction of Two-Year 
Cycle Notes
Between 1970 and the first half of 1972, midquarter refundings 
experienced unusually high attrition. In contrast to the 10 per-
cent attrition that was considered normal in the 1960s,20 the 
average rate of attrition in nine exchange offerings between 
19The only exceptions were November 1972, when only a small amount of 
securities had to be refinanced, and February 1973. The February 1973 
refunding followed the first sale of a long-term Treasury bond—a stand-alone 
offering of twenty-year bonds in January 1973—in eight years. Officials 
promised that they would let the twenty-year bonds “get fully digested” before 
they offered more bonds for sale (“U.S. to Offer 20-Year Bonds By New 
Method,” Wall Street Journal, December 29, 1972, p. 2).
Table 2
Stand-Alone Cash Subscription Offerings, January 1960-December 1969





(Billions of Dollars) Comment
Apr. 1960 2.1 2.00
Apr. 1960 25.1 1.50 The Treasury was “testing” public demand for long-term bonds.
Oct. 1961 1.6 2.00
Jan. 1962 7.7 1.00 The maturity of the offering came as a surprise to the market. Dealers had expected an offering with a
maturity of two to three years but the Treasury, feeling no immediate need to put upward pressure on short-
term rates, took advantage of an opportunity to lengthen the average maturity of the debt.
Apr. 1962 6.3 1.00 The offering came earlier than expected (it had been expected for late May or early June) because individual 
income tax refunds ran ahead of expectations. The Treasury again felt no immediate need to put upward 
pressure on short-term rates and again took advantage of the opportunity to lengthen average maturity.
Jun. 1963 7.2 1.25 The Treasury felt the market was “clearly ready” to accept an intermediate-term issue.
Mar. 1964 1.3 1.00 The Treasury chose a short-term issue to do the financing “in an inconspicuous way” because the market 
was “trying to find itself.”
Jan. 1966 0.8 1.50 The maturity was kept short to make the offering more appealing to banks.
Aug. 1967 3.5 2.50 Dealers had expected a longer (five-to-seven-year) issue. They conjectured that the Treasury was reluctant to 
issue longer because that would have required a higher coupon rate and provoked more disintermediation 
from thrift institutions.
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York circulars (1960-67); New York Times (1960-67); Wall Street Journal (1960-67).62 The Emergence of “Regular and Predictable”
Chart 7
Maturities of Offerings of Coupon-Bearing Securities, 
January 1970-December 1981
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York circulars (1970-81).
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February 1970 and February 1972 was 24.3 percent. The high 
attrition forced the Treasury to rebuild its cash balances by 
issuing additional securities, including a total of $7.25 billion of 
new notes in four stand-alone cash offerings between June 1971 
and April 1972.
The spate of stand-alone offerings—there had been only 
eleven in the 1960s—led Treasury officials to begin to think 
about “regularizing” their note offerings. In March 1972, 
Under Secretary of the Treasury Paul Volcker revealed that 
Treasury officials were considering whether “to routinize or 
regularize the handling of more of our debt, as we have done 
for many years in the bill area.”21 In particular, officials were 
considering whether, “in contrast to building up the present 
concentration of note and bond maturities at quarterly 
intervals [that is, on the fifteenth of the second month of each 
quarter], to be handled flexibly at the Treasury’s discretion at 
maturity,” it might not be better to adopt a scheme of “more 
frequent but also more routine rolling over of relatively short-
20The average rate of attrition for all exchange offerings in midquarter 
refundings between February 1960 and November 1969 was 13.4 percent. 
The average falls to 9.8 percent if the refundings in the third quarter of 1964 
and the first quarter of 1965 are excluded. Those two refundings were 
accelerated several weeks, to mid-July and mid-January, respectively, and 
were not representative of other refundings. They had respective attrition 
rates of 67.0 percent and 54.5 percent.
21Volcker (1972). See also “Proposals on Reform of Debt Management Offered 
by Volcker,” New York Times, March 8, 1972, p. 57, and “Treasury Seeking to 
Put More Borrowing on Regular Basis, as With Bill Auctions,” Wall Street 
Journal, March 8, 1972, p. 2.
term notes.” Such a scheme might “reduce market 
uncertainties . . . caused by large intermittent financing 
operations.” 
Treasury officials took the first step toward putting short-
term note sales on a regular schedule when they announced in 
early October 1972 that they would begin shortly to auction 
two-year notes at regular quarterly intervals. The first 
tranche—$2 billion of notes maturing on September 30, 
1974—was auctioned on October 11. One market participant 
praised the new program as “safe, simple, and not at all 
damaging to the market.”22
Although Treasury officials initially intended to sell subse-
quent issues of two-year notes at the end of every quarter, the 
new program got off to a somewhat irregular start. A second 
offering came at the end of December but, because the 
Treasury’s cash balances grew unexpectedly in the next six 
months, officials canceled the offerings that had been expected 
in March and June 1973.23 The Treasury returned to issuing 
quarterly two-year notes in September 1973.
The Treasury’s two-year note program broke new ground in 
two ways. Most important, it was the first program of regular 
and predictable sales of coupon-bearing securities with a 
specified term to maturity. Additionally, it broke the pattern of 
coupon-bearing securities always maturing on the fifteenth of 
the second month of a quarter. Debt management officials 
clearly intended that two-year notes should be on their own 
self-sustaining cycle, separate and apart from the midquarter 
refundings that had previously dominated Treasury finance.24
The introduction of two-year cycle notes put short-term 
note sales on a regular schedule but it did not signal that longer 
term notes and bonds would soon be sold on a regular and 
predictable basis. Volcker commented in his March 1972 
speech that “regularization and routinization are nice 
sounding words; straightjacket and rigidity are not. From 
where I sit, I cannot help but be conscious of the number of 
22“Treasury Treads Lightly At Outset of Big Funding,” New York Times, 
October 6, 1972, p. 59.
23U.S. Treasury Department (1973, pp. 12, 22) and “Treasury Postpones 
$2 Billion Note Offering,” Wall Street Journal, April 2, 1973, p. 17.
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times in which particular market or economic objectives may 
influence the Treasury’s thinking as to the form of a particular 
financing.”25 His comments suggest that Treasury officials 
were not prepared to abandon tactical discretion in 1972. The 
cancellation of the two-year note auctions in March and June 
1973 support that conjecture.
5.  Embracing Regular and Predictable 
as a Debt Management Strategy
The pattern of growth in marketable Treasury debt changed 
dramatically in fiscal year 1975. Outstanding notes and bonds 
increased by $25 billion between June 30, 1974, and June 30, 
1975, an increase substantially in excess of the increases in prior 
years. The rapid expansion of the deficit led Treasury officials 
to regularize note sales beyond the two-year sector.
5.1 The Increasing Pace of Treasury
 Financings
Forecasts of the federal budget deficit deteriorated rapidly 
during the winter of 1974-75. In November 1974, officials 
estimated that the deficit for the fiscal year ending June 30, 
1975, would be about $9 billion and that the deficit for fiscal 
year 1976 would be $10 billion-$20 billion.26 By mid-March 
1975, the deficit projections had grown to $45 billion and 
$80 billion, respectively.27
The five-fold growth in the two-year deficit, from 
$25 billion to $125 billion, meant that the Treasury would 
24The introduction of two-year cycle notes had two knock-on effects. First, it 
led officials to replace monthly sales of one-year bills (issued at the end of a 
month and maturing at the end of the same month one year later) with quad-
weekly sales of fifty-two-week bills. This released end-of-month maturity dates 
for the new two-year notes. Additionally, beginning in August 1972, the 
Treasury extended the maturities of anchor issues in midquarter refundings 
from less than two years to about three years. By the end of 1972, the Treasury 
was offering fifty-two-week bills once every four weeks, two-year notes at the 
end of every quarter, and notes with about three years to maturity in the middle 
of each quarter.
25Volcker (1972). Similarly, Edward Roob, Special Assistant to the Treasury 
Secretary for Monetary Affairs, remarked in 1973 that despite the benefits of 
regular and predictable note offerings, “we cannot tie down our debt-
management strategy too much” (Roob 1973, p. 184).
26“Fiscal ’76 Budget Deficit is Now Likely, In a Range of $10 Billion to 
$20 Billion,” New York Times, November 11, 1974, p. 3, and “Estimate of Fiscal 
’75 U.S. Deficit Raised By Ford Aides as Recession Cuts Revenues,” Wall Street 
Journal, November 21, 1974, p. 2.
27“$37-Billion Rise in Deficit Is Seen,” New York Times, March 18, 1975, p. 15, 
and Committee on the Budget (1975, pp. 996, 1030, 1033, testimony of 
Secretary of the Treasury William Simon).
have to sell an unprecedented (for a peacetime economy) 
volume of new securities. As early as December 1974, 
economists at one large dealer firm were predicting that 
stand-alone cash offerings would “most likely be [made] in 
nearly each month of [the next] half year.”28 The Treasury 
made a total of nine such offerings in fiscal year 1975 
(Table 3), easily breaking the previous record of four 
stand-alone offerings in fiscal year 1972.
Treasury officials struggled to cope with the growing 
financing requirements. In January 1975, they announced an 
offering of two-year notes outside of the quarterly cycle 
established in 1972-73. Under Secretary of the Treasury Jack 
Bennett stated that “in the coming months, we will be studying 
the possibility of establishing regular month-end, rather than 
quarter-end, two-year notes.”29 Officials confirmed the new 
monthly frequency in early April.30
The Treasury also began to give market participants more 
notice of when it would offer securities. In late February 1975, 
Under Secretary Bennett announced that it would auction four 
new issues in a three-week interval between mid-March and 
early April. The New York Times commented that the “unusual 
28“Treasury Plans Big Borrowings,” New York Times, December 30, 1974, p. 39 
(forecast of Henry Kaufman and Albert Gross of Salomon Brothers).
29Committee on Ways and Means (1975, p. 16, transcript of news conference 
on Treasury financing plans by Under Secretary Jack Bennett on January 22, 
1975).
30“Official of Treasury Discloses Need for $41-Billion,” New York Times, 
April 1, 1975, p. 62.
    
Table 3
Stand-Alone Cash Offerings, January 1974-
December 1975







Oct. 23, 1974 Nov. 6, 1974 May 15, 1979 4.5 1.00
Dec. 30, 1974 Jan. 7, 1975 May 15, 1979 4.4 1.25
Jan. 2, 1975 Jan. 9, 1975 Mar. 31, 1976a 1.2 0.75
Feb. 19, 1975 Mar. 3, 1975 Aug. 31, 1976b 1.5 1.65
Mar. 11, 1975 Mar. 19, 1975 Nov. 15, 1981 6.7 1.75
Mar. 13, 1975 Mar. 25, 1975 May 31, 1976b 1.2 1.60
Mar. 20, 1975 Apr. 7, 1975 May 15, 1990 15.1 1.25
Apr. 1, 1975 Apr. 8, 1975 Nov. 30, 1976b 1.6 1.50
May 22, 1975 Jun. 6, 1975 Oct. 31, 1976b 1.4 1.60
Sep. 24, 1975 Oct. 7, 1975 Feb. 28, 1978 2.4 2.10
Oct. 7, 1975 Oct. 22, 1975 Dec. 31, 1978 3.2 2.50
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York circulars (1974-75).
aOffering reflects the reopening of an outstanding two-year note.
bDate represents an end-of-month maturity date not already filled by 
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advance disclosure … was aimed at giving the … market some 
idea of how the Treasury will be coping with the large present 
and impending budget deficit.” Bennett said he wanted to give 
investors an opportunity to “get ready and find a place” for the 
coming issues.31
In spite of their efforts, Treasury officials soon reached the 
limit of what could be accommodated within the existing debt 
management framework. On March 20, 1975, the Treasury 
auctioned $1.25 billion of fifteen-year bonds at the same time 
that an underwriting syndicate led by Morgan Stanley & Co. 
brought to market the largest industrial debt offering in 
history: $300 million of ten-year notes and $300 million of 
thirty-year debentures from AAA-rated General Motors 
Corporation. The simultaneous offerings left the bond market 
in “chaos.” One dealer described the market as a “disaster,” 
another said it was a “shambles,” and the New York Times 
reported that “the head-on competition between the most 
credit-worthy borrowers from the public and private sectors 
left the . . . market in disarray.”32 The chairman of the Joint 
Economic Committee, Senator Hubert Humphrey of 
Minnesota, characterized Treasury debt management as 
“being conducted in an inexplicable and seemingly highly 
inappropriate fashion.”33
5.2 A Change in Strategy
The deficit had to be financed, but Treasury officials and other 
market participants appreciated that head-on competition and 
closely spaced tactical offerings could be reduced by replacing 
stand-alone sales with regular and predictable offerings.34 
In June 1975, Treasury officials announced $1.75 billion of 
four-year notes that “might be the first of a ‘cycle’ of four-year 
notes maturing at the end of a quarter.”35 “Might” turned to 
“would” when officials announced a second tranche of four-
year notes in August.36 
31“$7-Billion in Borrowing Is Planned by Treasury,” New York Times, February 25, 
1975, p. 45, and “Treasury to Raise Total of $7 Billion Via Spring Issues,” 
Wall Street Journal, February 25, 1975, p. 3.
32“Treasury Bond Auction Creates Chaos; Supply of Money Shows a Record 
Rise,” New York Times, March 21, 1975, p. 53, and “Financier for the U.S. 
Debt,” New York Times, April 20, 1975, p. F7.
33“Financier for the U.S. Debt,” New York Times, April 20, 1975, p. F7. 
See also Joint Economic Committee (1975).
34As early as February 1975, two Treasury advisory committees had 
recommended expanding the use of cycle notes to maturities beyond two years 
(Committee on Ways and Means 1975, pp. 25, 31, transcript of news 
conference by Under Secretary Jack Bennett, February 24, 1975).
35“2 New Notes, More Bills Set but No Long-Term Issue,” New York Times, 
June 19, 1975, p. 63. 
Five months later, in January 1976, shortly after what 
initially looked like a stand-alone auction of five-year notes, 
Under Secretary of the Treasury Edwin Yeo announced that 
officials were “seriously considering” adopting a new series of 
five-year notes.37 In early April, the Treasury issued a second 
tranche of five-year notes without additional comment, but 
when it announced a third tranche for settlement in early July 
an official stated that investors could henceforth expect the 
Treasury to issue five-year notes at the beginning of each 
quarter.38 Thus, by mid-1976, the Treasury was issuing two-
year notes monthly and four- and five-year notes quarterly.
Observers pointed out that the Treasury did not have any 
immediate need for the proceeds of the third five-year note 
offering in July 1976, but that it had nevertheless proceeded 
with the offering to maintain a regular and predictable auction 
schedule.39 That decision—the reverse of the tactical decisions 
to cancel the two-year note auctions in March and June 1973 
because of ample cash balances—was an important step in the 
adoption of a strategic approach to Treasury debt manage-
ment. The Treasury never again canceled an auction merely 
because it had no immediate need for additional funds. 
Instead, it sold securities on a regular and predictable basis 
and managed any undesirably large cash balances through its 
Treasury Tax and Loan program,40 by reducing the amounts 
offered or, as we discuss in Section 7, by terminating a series. 
Box 3 describes the subsequent extension of regular and 
predictable issuance in the late 1970s and early 1980s. By the 
beginning of 1982, the Treasury had added a seven-year note 
series and a twenty-year bond series and it had standardized 
the midquarter refundings with regular offerings of three- and 
ten-year notes and thirty-year bonds. 
36The Wall Street Journal referred to the second tranche of four-year notes as 
“the second four-year cycle note.” “Treasury Boosts Earlier Estimate of Its 
Cash Needs,” Wall Street Journal, August 7, 1975, p. 3.
37“Treasury Plans Heavy Borrowing,” New York Times, January 28, 1976, p. 58, 
and “Treasury to Sell $13.8 Billion Bills, Notes and Bonds,” Wall Street Journal, 
January 28, 1976, p. 25.
38“Treasury to Sell Notes To Raise $2.5 Billion New Cash Next Week,” Wall 
Street Journal, March 17, 1976, p. 27, and “Treasury Refines Its Management of 
Federal Debt,” New York Times, June 28, 1976, p. 50.
39“Treasury to Raise $2.5 Billion by Selling 61-month Notes Despite Bulging 
Coffers,” Wall Street Journal, June 28, 1976, p. 15.
40Brockschmidt (1975), McDonough (1976), and Lovett (1978) describe the 
Treasury Tax and Loan program in the 1970s. Garbade, Partlan, and Santoro 
(2004) describe the present program.
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Regularization of coupon offerings proved enormously 
popular. The Wall Street Journal described it as a “widely 
applauded campaign to finance the nation’s debt in a more 
orderly manner” and an observer noted that “regularity makes 
a lot of sense from a debt management view. Making … new 
issues available on a regular basis gives market participants a 
better feel for the securities when they are sold.”41 A dealer 
41“Treasury to Raise $2.5 Billion by Selling 61-month Notes Despite Bulging 
Coffers,” Wall Street Journal, June 28, 1976, p. 15.
stated that cycle notes “have enabled the Treasury to raise 
enormous amounts of money, have minimized any impact on 
the securities markets, have reduced uncertainty, have 
extended the average maturity of the national debt, and 
produced a better defined yield curve.”42
42“New Interest in Treasury Yields,” New York Times, October 30, 1977, p. 120. 
See also “Decoding the Treasury’s Auction Agenda,” New York Times, May 20, 
1979, p. F2.
Maturities of Cycle Notes and Regularized Notes 
and Bonds, January 1975-December 1981
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York circulars (1975-81).
Note: Monthly two-year and quarterly four- and seven-year cycle notes 
are depicted as circles; regularized beginning-of-quarter offerings 
(initially five-year notes, then alternating five-year notes and 
fifteen-year bonds, then fifteen-year bonds, then twenty-year bonds) 
are depicted as squares; regularized beginning-of-third-month-of-
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Box 3
Debt Management between 1977 and 1982
Marketable Treasury debt continued to grow rapidly in the late 
1970s and early 1980s (Chart 5). That growth led Treasury officials 
to expand further their new program of regular and predictable 
issuance.
In April 1977, Under Secretary of the Treasury Anthony 
Solomon announced that in the interest of extending the average 
maturity of the debt, officials were considering substituting a 
fifteen-year bond for the five-year note that they would normally 
auction for settlement in early July.a They made the change and 
thereafter alternated fifteen-year bonds and five-year notes for  
another four quarters (see chart below). In September 1978, the 
Treasury eliminated five-year notes and began offering fifteen-year 
bonds exclusively for settlement at the beginning of every quarter.
The replacement of five-year notes with fifteen-year bonds left 
the five-year sector open. When the Treasury needed to raise new 
funds in August 1979 it announced a stand-alone five-year issue. 
Under Secretary Solomon stated explicitly that officials did not 
anticipate issuing five-year notes on a regular basis.b However, the 
press of financing requirements led the Treasury to continue to 
auction five-year notes for settlement in the beginning of the third 
month of every quarter.
In March 1976, Congress extended the maximum maturity of a 
note to ten years. Thereafter, the Treasury twice offered ten-year 
notes in lieu of seven-year notes in its midquarter refundings 
(Chart 7). In November 1977, it began to alternate the two 
maturities and in August 1980 it made ten-year notes a regular part 
of the midquarter offerings.
The replacement of seven-year notes with ten-year notes in 
midquarter refundings left the seven-year sector open. When the 
Treasury needed to raise still more funds at the beginning of 1981, 
it introduced a seven-year cycle note. At the same time, it replaced 
the fifteen-year bond with a twenty-year bond, reportedly because 
fifteen-year bonds had not been popular with investors.c
a“U.S., With Cash Surplus in Quarter, Plans to Pay Off $2 Billion of Debt,” 
New York Times, April 28, 1977, p. 85, and “Treasury to Sell $3.75 Billion 
of Securities,” Wall Street Journal, April 28, 1977, p. 33.
b“Treasury Schedules a $7.25 Billon Sale,” New York Times, July 26, 1979, 
p. D7, and “Treasury to Raise Additional Cash of $2.42 Billion,” Wall Street 
Journal, July 26, 1979, p. 32.
c“Yields of Treasury Bills Tumble,” New York Times, December 23, 1980, 
p. D5. See also Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs (1982, 
p. 78, reporting the opinion of a Treasury advisory committee that “the 
fifteen-year bond has not had an auspicious history in the market”).66 The Emergence of “Regular and Predictable”
6.  The Cost of Tactical Issuance
Treasury officials began to switch from tactical issuance to 
regular and predictable issuance when the fiscal environment 
changed. Officials had found tactical issuance useful in the 
1960s—it allowed them to advance any of a variety of policy 
objectives, depending on the circumstances of the moment—
and there is no reason to believe that this aspect of tactical 
issuance became less important.43 This suggests that the change 
to regular and predictable issuance occurred because of an 
increase in some cost associated with tactical offerings. We now 
present empirical evidence consistent with that proposition.
Our data are the constant maturity Treasury (CMT) yields 
reported in Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15. Daily 
yields on three-, five-, and ten-year coupon-bearing Treasury 
securities are available from January 1, 1962. We divided the 
data into four periods. The first period—January 1, 1962, to 
December 31, 1970—ends before the Treasury reentered the 
bond market in 1971 and before it had to rebuild its cash 
balances with four stand-alone cash offerings between June 
1971 and April 1972. The second period—January 1, 1971, to 
May 31, 1975—includes the stand-alone offerings of 1971-72, 
the rapid increase in the deficit during the first half of 1975, and 
the nine stand-alone cash offerings in fiscal year 1975. The 
third period—June 1, 1975, to December 31, 1981—begins 
with the introduction of four-year cycle notes in June 1975 and 
includes the subsequent extensions of regular and predictable 
issuance to five- and seven-year notes and twenty-year bonds. 
We are not sure when market participants finally concluded 
that the Treasury had wholeheartedly adopted a strategy of 
regular and predictable issuance,44 but it seems reasonable to 
believe that they reached that understanding no later than 
1982.45 Thus, the third period concludes at the end of 1981. 
The last period—January 1, 1982, to December 31, 1986—
includes offerings made following the unambiguous adoption 
of a regular and predictable strategy. 
43See, for example, Volcker’s 1972 comment on the value of discretion quoted 
in the text at footnote 25.
44Prior to 1982, Treasury officials sometimes denied, and sometimes failed to 
confirm, that an offering was the first in a new series rather than a stand-alone 
offering. See, for example, the discussion in the preceding section and in Box 3 
of the initial introduction of a five-year note series in 1976 and the 
reintroduction of a five-year series in 1979. In addition, some series were 
changed too quickly to justify characterizing them as regular and predictable 
offerings. See the discussion in Box 3 of the partial (and subsequently 
complete) substitution of fifteen-year bonds for five-year notes in 1977 and 
1978, the partial (and subsequently complete) substitution of ten-year notes 
for seven-year notes in midquarter refundings between 1976 and 1980, and the 
introduction of seven-year cycle notes and replacement of fifteen-year bonds 
with twenty-year bonds in 1981.
45See Chart 2 and the remarks of Deputy Assistant Secretary Stalnecker quoted 
in the text at footnote 2.
The Treasury announced offerings of coupon-bearing 
securities on thirty-eight different days between January 1, 
1971, and May 31, 1975 (Table 4, panel B). The root-mean-
square (RMS) change in the five-year CMT yield over the 
interval from the close of business one business day before an 
announcement to the close of business one business day after 
an announcement was 10.8 basis points.46 Over the same 
Table 4
Root-Mean-Square (RMS) Changes in Constant
Maturity Treasury Yields over Two-Day Intervals 
that Include Treasury Offering Announcements 
and over Other Two-Day Intervals
      
Sector
Interval Three-Year Five-Year Ten-Year
Number of 
Observations
Panel A: January 1, 1962-December 31, 1970
Announcement
   intervals 5.7  5.7  4.2 43
Other intervals 6.3 5.4 4.8 416
Panel B: January 1, 1971-May 31, 1975
Announcement
   intervals 11.6* 10.8** 6.7  38
Other intervals 9.3 7.9 5.6 192
Panel C: June 1, 1975-December 31, 1981
Announcement
   intervals 21.0** 18.9** 16.4** 152
Other intervals 14.7 14.2 12.0 209
Panel D: January 1, 1982-December 31, 1986
Announcement
   intervals 12.0 11.1 11.2 120
Other intervals 12.1 11.9 11.7 143
Panel C1: June 1, 1975-October 7, 1979
Announcement
   intervals 8.4 7.0 5.9 97
Other intervals 7.4 7.0 5.2 142
Panel C2: October 8, 1979-December 31, 1981
Announcement
   intervals 33.2** 30.0* 26.1* 55
Other intervals 23.7 22.9 19.8 67
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: RMS changes are expressed in basis points.
**Statistically significantly greater than the RMS yield change over two-
day intervals that did not include a Treasury offering announcement 
at a 1 percent confidence level.
*Statistically significantly greater than the RMS yield change over two-day 
intervals that did not include a Treasury offering announcement at a 
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period, there were 192 disjoint intervals of two consecutive 
business days, each of which was disjoint from the two-day 
intervals associated with the thirty-eight offering announce-
ments. The RMS change in the five-year yield over the 192 
nonannouncement intervals was 7.9 basis points. The “excess” 
yield volatility for the thirty-eight announcement intervals was 
therefore 2.9 basis points (2.9 = 10.8 – 7.9). We can reject the 
null hypothesis that the volatility of five-year CMT yields was 
the same for the thirty-eight announcement intervals and the 
192 nonannouncement intervals at a confidence level in excess 
of 1 percent.47 Similar comments apply to yield changes in the 
three-year sector. 
This result implies that, on average, more new information 
became available to market participants on days when the 
Treasury announced a new offering than on other days, and is 
consistent with the proposition that offering announcements 
contained new information relevant to the valuation of 
Treasury securities. More generally, the result is consistent with 
the proposition that investors were, on average, surprised by—
or, equivalently, did not fully anticipate—Treasury offering 
announcements between January 1971 and May 1975. It is not 
unreasonable to conjecture that the inability of investors to 
anticipate and plan for new issues led to higher financing costs 
for the Treasury.
In contrast, panel D of Table 4 shows that offering 
announcements after 1981 were not associated with unusual 
yield changes. This result implies that, following the 
unambiguous adoption of a regular and predictable issuance 
strategy, no more new information became available to market 
participants on days when the Treasury announced a new 
offering than on other days, and is consistent with the 
proposition that announcements of regular and predictable 
46The Treasury sometimes made offering announcements before the close of 
trading and sometimes after the close. We used a two-day interval to ensure 
that each yield change occurred over an interval that included an offering 
announcement.
47On the null hypothesis that yield changes over two-day intervals are normally 
distributed with a mean of zero and a common variance, the statistic 
(10.8/7.9)2 is distributed as F with 38 and 192 degrees of freedom. There is 
no evidence of any statistically significant mean change, or drift, in interest 
rates during announcement intervals in any of the four periods.
offerings did not contain new information. More generally, the 
result is consistent with the proposition that regular and 
predictable issuance reduced the element of surprise in 
Treasury offering announcements and therefore facilitated 
investor planning.
Two other features of Table 4 are of interest. First, panel A 
shows that offering announcements before 1971 were, on 
average, not associated with unusual yield changes. It is outside 
the scope of this article to identify the reason for this result,48 
but the result is consistent with the evident absence of any 
incentive for Treasury debt managers to shift to regular and 
predictable issuance in the 1960s.
The second interesting feature of Table 4 is that panel C 
suggests that offering announcements between June 1975 and 
December 1981 were associated with unusual yield changes. 
This result is surprising because the transition to regular and 
predictable issuance was well under way by the time the initial 
five-year series was formalized in July 1976. Nevertheless, 
panel C shows that excess yield volatility during announcement 
intervals was greater in the second half of the 1970s than in 
any of the other three periods. 
One possible explanation for this result is that the reaction 
of market participants to Treasury offering announcements 
changed following the well-known change in monetary policy 
in October 1979 that placed greater emphasis on control of 
monetary aggregates.49 Panels C1 and C2 of Table 4 divide the 
period from June 1975 to December 1981 into two subperiods. 
Panel C1 shows that after June 1975 but before the change in 
monetary policy, offering announcements were not associated 
with unusual yield changes. This is consistent with the propo-
sition that the benefits of adopting a regular and predictable 
strategy accrued rather quickly. Panel C2, however, suggests 
that these benefits were negated when the Federal Reserve 
altered its approach to monetary policy. The relationship 
between debt management policy and monetary policy is 
48One possibility is that, during the 1960s, Treasury officials did a better job 
communicating their financing plans prior to making formal offering 
announcements. Assessing this hypothesis would require careful study of 
informal contacts between Treasury officials and market participants.
49See Melton (1985, ch. 4).
[Our results suggest] that investors were, 
on average, surprised by—or, equivalently, 
did not fully anticipate—Treasury offering 
announcements between January 1971 
and May 1975.
[Our results suggest that after 1981,] 
regular and predictable issuance reduced 
the element of surprise in Treasury 
offering announcements and therefore 
facilitated investor planning.68 The Emergence of “Regular and Predictable”
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left for future research. For the present, it suffices to observe 
that the benefits of regular and predictable issuance reemerged 
when the Federal Reserve began to reemphasize control of 
interest rates.
7.  Debt Management Policymaking 
within the Framework of Regular 
and Predictable Issuance
The regularity of coupon-bearing debt offerings between 1982 
and 1986 (Chart 2) demonstrates that the Treasury had 
adopted a strategy of regular and predictable issuance by the 
beginning of 1982. The new strategy limited, but did not 
eliminate, the ability of Treasury debt managers to alter the 
timing and maturity of new issues.
Chart 8 shows offerings of coupon-bearing securities 
between 1987 and 2002. Several important debt management 
actions are evident, including:
￿ Termination of the four-year note series and initiation of 
monthly (in lieu of quarterly) five-year notes in January 
1991. The Treasury made the change to shift some of its 
financing activity from bills to intermediate-term 
notes.50
￿ Termination of the seven-year note series and reduction 
to semi-annual (in lieu of quarterly) issuance of thirty-
year bonds in May 1993. The Treasury made the change 
to shift some of its financing activity from intermediate-
term notes and long-term bonds to bills and shorter 
term notes in an effort to reduce interest expenses.51
￿ Termination of the three-year note series and reduction 
to quarterly (in lieu of monthly) issuance of five-year 
notes as part of the regular midquarter refundings in 
August 1998. Officials made the change in light of large 
and persistent federal budget surpluses and a material 
reduction in financing requirements.52
50“Treasury Announces Change in Regular Quarterly Auction Cycles 
Beginning in January 1991,” Treasury News, December 11, 1990. The Treasury 
also wanted to reduce the build-up of issues maturing on midquarter refunding 
dates. Five-year notes had previously been issued in the beginning of the third 
month of a quarter and matured in the middle of the following quarter five 
years and two and a half months later. The new five-year notes were issued at 
the end of a month and matured at the end of the same month five years later. 
51“Treasury Slashes Sales of Long-Term Bonds,” Wall Street Journal, May 6, 
1993, p. C1, and “Treasury Maturities Shortened,” New York Times, May 6, 
1993, p. D1.
52“It’s Two Steps Back for Short-Term Treasury’s,” Wall Street Journal, May 7, 
1998, p. C1.
These actions show that adherence to a regular and predictable 
issuance schedule did not foreclose the exercise of managerial 
discretion with respect to the maturity structure of new issues. 
Treasury debt managers have continued to alter the timing and 
maturities of new offerings in light of evolving fiscal conditions 
and their assessments of the costs and benefits of shorter term 
versus longer term financing, but they now choose the times 
and maturities of series of debt issues rather than of individual 
issues.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / March 2007 69
8. Conclusion
During the 1970s, Treasury officials changed the framework 
within which they made debt management decisions, 
transitioning from tactical issuance of notes and bonds to a 
regular and predictable schedule. The emergence of regular and 
predictable sales of Treasury notes and bonds reduced the 
element of surprise in Treasury offerings and allowed investors 
to plan future commitments of funds with greater confidence. 
Treasury officials have asserted repeatedly that regular and 
predictable issuance allows them to finance deficits and 
refinance maturing debt at the lowest possible interest rates 
consistent with contemporaneous market conditions.
Regular and predictable issuance was not a novel concept in 
the 1970s; the Treasury had been issuing bills on a regular 
schedule for decades. Nevertheless, debt managers had kept 
note and bond offerings on a tactical basis—in part because 
financing at least cost was not the only objective of Treasury 
debt management. Debt managers sometimes chose to issue 
short-term debt to maintain upward pressure on short-term 
interest rates and limit upward pressure on long-term rates; 
they sometimes chose to issue longer term debt to limit further 
contraction in the average maturity of Treasury debt. 
Regular and predictable issuance became more attractive 
after Treasury officials had to bring four stand-alone cash 
offerings in fiscal year 1972 as a result of unusually high 
attrition in midquarter exchange offerings. They introduced 
two-year cycle notes to put short-term note financings on a 
more routine basis. The much larger and more significant need 
to finance a rapid expansion of the deficit beginning in 1975 led 
them to phase in additional cycle notes in 1975 and 1976 and, 
ultimately, to abandon tactical issuance altogether.References
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